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2018 - 赵绪涛:科学实在论辩疑
  作者:pst    文章来源:本站原创    点击数:    更新时间:2018-5-22    
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题    目:科学实在论辩疑

答 辩 人:赵绪涛

指导老师:王伯鲁教授

答辩时间:2018514

 

引言  科学实在论争论之审度

1 标准科学实在论及其辩护  

1.1 标准科学实在论之界定  

1.1.1 “版本数量大于研究人数”  

1.1.2 “科学为真”

1.2 辩护:从“成功”到“为真”  

1.2.1 无奇迹论证  

1.2.2 稳健性论证  

1.2.3 最佳说明推理  

1.2.4 辩护链条

2 标准科学实在论的难题  

2.1 针对辩护方式的反驳  

2.1.1 最佳说明推理的难题

2.1.2 悲观归纳论证:成功与真无关

2.1.3 重新发现科学唯实论及其意义  

2.2 针对真理立场的反驳  

2.2.1 标准科学实在论真理观两难  

2.2.2 科学实在论与真理关系的消除主义进路

 

3 标准科学实在论作为强纲领

3.1 科学哲学的反标准科学实在论传统  

3.1.1 从逻辑实证主义到证伪主义

3.1.2 历史主义和建构主义

3.2 自然科学家的反科学实在论传统

3.2.1 拯救现象:古代天文学的传统  

3.2.2 牛顿的万有引力:不臆造形而上学假说  

3.2.3 近代电磁理论的实在论之争

3.2.4 玻尔的工具主义

3.3 标准科学实在论仅为特定科学哲学观点

4 非标准科学实在论:对实在的辩护姿态  

4.1 所谓实在问题

4.2 实在问题之争:我们到了哪里  

4.3 结构实在论作为争论的分界  

4.4 科学实在论争论双方的共识

4.4.1 全面实在论:存在外部世界

4.4.2 全面反实在论:认知无法通达实在

4.5 主要的反实在论转化为科学实在论版本

4.6 科学实在论究竟是什么

5 科学实在论争论不能解决实在问题  

5.1 量子力学解释悬而未决  

5.2 弦物理学与当前科学实在论无关  

  5.2.1 非经验证实的三个理由和三个论证  

  5.2.2 为什么相信一个理论  

  5.2.3 非经验证实论证的缺陷  

5.3 暗物质和暗能量研究支持非充分决定性论证 109

  5.3.1 暗物质理论的发展 110

  5.3.2 暗能量概念的兴起 112

  5.3.3 支持非充分决定性论证

5.4 科学问题和科学实在论问题

6 科学的实在观

6.1 恰当地理解科学和实在:审度的科学实在论立场

6.2 从标准科学实在论到科学的实在观

6.3 推荐依赖模型实在论

  6.3.1 “神目观”的破除

  6.3.2 依赖模型实在论的理论渊源

  6.3.3 超越争论

  6.3.4 依赖模型实在论的意义

结语  相信科学:科学乐观主义者的一个宣言

参考文献

后记和致谢

附录

 

                                摘  要

 

 

科学实在论究竟是什么以及应当是什么,是本文要探究的核心问题。

文章的第一章至第四章分析了前一问题,第五章和第六章分析后一问题。

扼要的回答是:“科学实在论”这一术语同时指称相互矛盾的“标准科学实在论”和“非标准科学实在论”,这导致了科学实在论争论的疑局;科学实在论,在指称上,应当是所谓的“广义的科学实在论”,在内容上,应当是“科学的实在观”。

第一章至第四章旨在以一种新的思路理解科学实在论争论,并凸显科学实在论争论的疑局。

第一章分析了“科学实在论”这一术语通常指称的立场,即标准科学实在论。其特点是,以形而上学、语义学、认识论三个论题为界定标准,以无奇迹论证为核心辩护,试图从科学成功的事实,得到科学为(近似)真的认识论结论;第二章分析了其难题是,以最佳说明推理为基本辩护策略并不可靠;“科学求真”这种认识本身也并不合理。第三章指出,标准科学实在论是一种过强的立场,其标准难以得到满足。它只是20世纪70-80年代一些科学哲学家提出的特定立场。

非标准科学实在论,是指那些从语义学或认识论进路反对标准科学实在论的、亦被称为“科学实在论”的立场,比如实体实在论、结构实在论等。

第四章提出一个论证——即主要的反实在论(比如建构经验论)的核心主张可以转化为科学实在论版本;并指出“科学实在论”这个术语缺少清晰的含义。

如果将“科学实在论”理解为依据或审视自然科学的、对外部世界(至少一部分,比如实体、过程和结构)的实在性进行辩护的立场(这是标准科学实在论和非标准科学实在论唯一的共同特征),那么经过转化的反实在论也将包含在这个概念中。在这个意义上,“科学实在论”其实是指对实在的具有辩护姿态的立场,而不仅是通常所理解的标准科学实在论。

第五章和第六章试图在上述理解的基础上,对科学实在论进行审度,并以“科学的实在观”为核心概念理解科学实在论争论的意义,也就是恰当地理解科学和实在。

第五章分析了当代物理学前沿的三个领域,指出科学实在论既不能以它们为基础也不能为它们提供辩护,主要原因在于它们很大程度上还在发展之中、尚无定论。其中,暗物质和暗能量的研究现状明显支持了反实在论的非充分决定性论证。并且强调不能混淆科学问题和科学哲学问题,明确了二者的区别,则科学实在论争论的意义也就变得明确。

第六章将科学实在论争论的恰当意义理解为:恰当地理解科学以及恰当地理解实在。这也正是对科学实在论争论的审度取向的最终目标。以此方式理解科学实在论争论,则会明确,一种依据或审视自然科学的、对外部世界(或至少其一部分,比如实体、过程或结构)的实在性进行辩护的立场,究竟应该称之为科学实在论、反实在论、抑或是“广义的科学实在论”并非至关重要的问题。重要的问题在于这种观点如何可能,以及具体来说它应当如何。

为了表述的方便,本文将使人们对科学和实在的理解更加深刻的立场称为“科学的实在观”,以取代以往的科学实在论和反实在论的划分。

科学实在论争论的历程可视为标准科学实在论向科学的实在观的转变。科学的实在观至少有三个特征:依赖或审视自然科学对实在的探究成果;慎重对待任何形而上学预设;对科学及科学哲学未来的任何可能发展保持开放的姿态。

文章最后推荐依赖模型实在论,作为一种基于当代自然科学和科学哲学的、恰当的“科学的实在观”。

结语部分简洁地表达了对科学实在论疑难之辩:“科学实在论”指称不清晰、主要的反实在论可以转化为科学实在论版本、“科学实在论”应当被理解为“科学的实在观”,回顾了文章的主要内容,并且表达了一种科学乐观主义者对待实在问题的态度:相信科学。

关键词:科学实在论;反实在论;实在观

 

 

Abstract

What is exactly and what should be the scientific realism are the core issues of this article.

Chapter 1~4 analyzed the “what is exactly” question, Chapter 5 and 6 analyzed the “what should be” question.

The concise answer is: the term “scientific realism” concurrently refers to contradictory “standard scientific realism” and “non-standard scientific realism”, this resulted in the suspicion of scientific realism; scientific realism, in terms of reference, should be the so-called “general scientific realism”, and in terms of content, should be the “scientific conception of reality”.

Chapter 1~4 aim at comprehending the scientific realism debates with a new approach and try to reveal the above-mentioned suspicion.

Chapter 1 analyzed what the term “scientific realism” commonly referred. Its main characteristics are that, it defined by metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology thesis; it defended mainly by the no-miracles argument, and concluded with science is (approximately) true because of the fact that science is successful. This kind of scientific realism was denoted with “standard scientific realism” (SSR for short in this context). The problems of SSR are that, which is analyzed in Chapter 2, defenses based on Inference to the Best Explanation are essentially unreliable; and the view of “science pursues truth”, is not appropriate. Chapter 3 stated that SSR is a position too strong to be satisfied. It is just a specific position put forward by some scientific philosophers in 1970s~1980s.

Non-SSR refers to positions objecting SSR in semantic and epistemological approaches, yet still be called with “scientific realism”, such as realism about entity and structural realism.   

Chapter 4 proposed a novel argument that the main claims of current anti-realisms can be translated into a scientific realism version. Then, the term “scientific realism” lacks clarity.

However, if “scientific realism” is comprehended as the position based on or examines natural sciences and defends the reality of external world (at least a part of it, such as entities, processes, and structures), then the transformed anti-realism will also be included in this concept. This comprehension is the only common feature of both SSR and non-SSR. “scientific realism” in this sense, is denoting the positions with defensive gesture of reality, instead of its usual implications.

Chapter 5 and 6 reconsidered scientific realism debates based on above mentioned clues and revealed the appropriate significance of the debates, which is appropriately understand science and reality, with the core concept, “scientific conception of reality”.

Chapter 5 analyzed three frontiers of contemporary physics and indicated that they could neither be the foundation of scientific realism, nor be defended by it, the main reason is that they are not mature theories. Among these frontiers, the current research status of dark matter and dark energy clearly supports the underdetermination argument of anti-realism. Furthermore, science questions and philosophy of science questions should not be confused, once the differences of them is clarified, then the significance of the debates could be clarified.

Chapter 6 comprehended the proper significance of scientific realism debates as appropriately understand science and reality. This is also the ultimate significance of the reconsideration of the debates. With this comprehension, a position based on or examines natural sciences and defends the reality of external world (or at least part of it, such as entities, processes, and structures), whatever it should be called, for instance, scientific realism, anti-realism or general scientific realism, is not a crucial issue; the crucial issue should be how this view might be and specifically what it should be.

For the convenience of expression, this article refers to the view that makes people more profoundly understand science and reality as the “scientific conception of reality.”

The progress of scientific realism debates could be regarded as establishing more appropriate scientific conception of reality from the SSR. Scientific conception of reality has at least three characteristics: it depends on the inquiries of reality of natural sciences; it carefully treats any metaphysical presupposition; and remain open to any possible development of science and philosophy of science in the future.

At last, this article recommended the model-dependent realism as an appropriate scientific conception of reality in the background of contemporary natural sciences and philosophy of science.

The conclusion part briefly reviewed the contents of this article after concisely expressed the analysis of the suspicion of scientific realism: the reference of “scientific realism” is not clear; main anti-realisms can be translated into a scientific realism version; “scientific realism” should be understood as “scientific conception of reality”; and expressed a scientific optimist’s attitude towards reality issues: trust science.

Keywords: Scientific Realism; Anti-Realism; Conception of Reality

 

 

 

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